As debate continues over changing eligibility thresholds and the role of subsidized coverage, 5.5 million eligible children remain uninsured. I n response to r apidly rising uninsur ance among children, federal and state governments have worked together for two decades to increase the availability of free or highly subsidized public health insurance for children. Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s were followed in the late 1990s by the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). In 2003 the uninsurance rate among children age eighteen and younger, which exceeded 16 percent in 1987 and 1996, dropped for the first time in nearly three decades below its 1977 level of 12.5 percent.
I n response to r apidly rising uninsur ance among children, federal and state governments have worked together for two decades to increase the availability of free or highly subsidized public health insurance for children. Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s were followed in the late 1990s by the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). In 2003 the uninsurance rate among children age eighteen and younger, which exceeded 16 percent in 1987 and 1996, dropped for the first time in nearly three decades below its 1977 level of 12.5 percent. 1 Despite this achievement, concerns about rapid increases in public coverage, ongoing declines in private coverage, and the number of children remaining uninsured have sparked a lively debate over future strategies for covering children. 2 This paper seeks to help inform the debate using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). We examined eligibility and coverage during 1996-2005, focusing on the postexpansion period, 2001-2005. Because we used a consistent data source and applied a consistent simulation methodology over time, our results provide valuable evidence to use in tracking changes in eligibility and coverage over the past decade. In addition, we examine the socioeconomic charac-ble for comprehensive public coverage that required payment of a premium, either through Medicaid Section 1115 waivers or through state-funded programs.
"Expansion" and "rollback." We defined two additional groups of policy interest: "Expansion" children are those who would become eligible if all state income thresholds were uniformly expanded to 300 percent of poverty; "rollback" children are those who would lose eligibility if thresholds were moved downward, to 200 percent of poverty. In both cases, we held constant all existing eligibility rules. The expansion group excluded children in states that have implemented or enacted threshold increases to 300 percent of poverty or beyond as of early 2007. In both the expansion and rollback scenarios, we focused solely on uniform changes in income thresholds. Our objective was solely to provide additional information regarding children just above and below existing thresholds, and we did not model important issues regarding SCHIP's funding and matching rules, states' responses to federal changes, "grandfathering" of current enrollees, states' enrollment freezes and caps, or families' behavioral responses.
Study Results
n Expansions in eligibility. From 1996 to 2001, the number of eligible children nearly doubled, rising from 21.7 million in 1996 to 37.3 million in 2001 (Exhibit 1) (SE, 1.2 and 2.1, respectively). In the "postexpansion" years since 2001, eligibility essentially remained steady, ranging from 37.3 million to 38.8 million children (SE, 0.3).
In contrast to total eligibility, public coverage rose markedly during the postexpansion period. Among children simulated to be eligible, the number with public coverage rose from 16.2 million in 2001 to 21.0 million in 2005 (SE, 1.1 and 0.9). This increase occurred as private coverage declined, from 13.5 million to 11.4 million children (SE, 0.9 and 0.6). As a result of expanded public coverage, the number of eligible but uninsured children, which had risen with expanded eligibility to a peak of 7. H e a l t h R e f o r m (in 1996) and Medicaid Section 1931 (after 1996), the Ribicoff Children program, Medicaid medically needy coverage, poverty-related Medicaid expansions for children, Medicaid waivers providing free coverage to children or families or both, and children eligible for separate state programs for immigrants who would have been eligible for Medicaid apart from their immigration status. d Includes children with private coverage who would otherwise be eligible for SCHIP based on income, assets, and immigration status. Also includes a small number of children eligible for comprehensive public coverage that required payment of a premium, either through Medicaid Section 1115 waivers or through state-funded programs, as well as children eligible for separate state programs for immigrants who would have been eligible for SCHIP apart from their immigration status. e Children who would become eligible if all SCHIP programs expanded to 300 percent of the federal poverty level (net of disregards). Existing state rules governing immigrant children are assumed to apply. f Children who would lose eligibility if no SCHIP programs had income thresholds exceeding 200 percent of the federal poverty level (net of standard disregards). much lower uninsurance rate (8.9 percent) than eligible children (Exhibit 2). A total of 3.5 million (SE, 0.2; data not shown) uninsured children were ineligible for public coverage in 2004-05. Note that some children held public coverage despite being simulated to be ineligible, which likely reflects a mix of continuation coverage for children in families whose incomes rose after enrollment; Medicaid medically needy spend-down; administrative errors in enrollment; and misreporting of income, family structure, or coverage.
n Comparison with other estimates. Our estimate of 6.5 million eligible but uninsured children in 1999 is 0.3 million below the corresponding estimate of 6.8 million from the National Survey of American Families (NSAF), a difference likely attributable in part to the NSAF estimate's measuring uninsurance as of the interview date. 6 Our 2004-05 estimate of 5.6 million eligible but uninsured children is lower than the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) estimate of 6.2 million based on the 2005 CPS. 7 This difference likely stems from our application of immigrationrelated rules that ban federally funded coverage of immigrants for five years. We estimate that one million children (SE, 0.08) met all income, asset, and age requirements in pooled 2004-2005 but were ineligible for Medicaid and SCHIP based on their immigration status. Of this group, 0.6 million were uninsured (SE, 0.06). A 2005 CPS study that adjusted eligibility for immigration status found that 5.4 million eligible children were uninsured, with 0.6 million ineligible based on their immigration status. 8 Finally, our estimates of SCHIP-eligible uninsured children in 2004 (1.9 million, SE, 0.2; data not shown) are very close to another CPS-based estimate of 1.8 million. 9 A recent analysis produced for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) using the Urban Institute's CPS-based Transfer Income Model (TRIM) estimated that the number of eligible but uninsured children was only 1.1 million in 2003-04. 10 Whereas we defined coverage using a round-level measure, the TRIM analysis counted children as uninsured only if they lacked coverage for the entire calendar year. Subsetting to eligible uninsured children who remained uninsured for the entire year (and who did not turn age nineteen), our estimate for federally funded, SCHIP-eligible uninsured children in 2003-04 is 1.0 million (SE, 0.09). This is slightly higher than the corresponding TRIM estimate of 0.79 million. In contrast, our full-year-uninsured estimate for Medicaid-eligible uninsured children is 1.8 million, which is much larger than the corresponding TRIM estimate of 0.26 million. The TRIM Medicaid-eligible-uninsured estimate translates into approximately one eligible but uninsured child for every 100 children enrolled in Medicaid. A key aspect of the TRIM estimates is that the CPS underestimates public coverage by one-third relative to administrative counts, and TRIM modelers fix this by assigning public coverage to five million children who were reported to be uninsured. 11 In contrast, MEPS estimates of publicly insured children are much closer to administrative benchmarks-capturing seven of every eight children on public coverage. Moreover, in the 2003-04 MEPS, only 0.3 milw 6 2 2 1 6 A u g u s t 2 0 0 7 lion children were reported to be full-year uninsured and yet had medical events paid for by public coverage. For this reason, we did not adjust the MEPS estimates of uninsurance for underreported public coverage. 12 n Simulated threshold changes. Results at the bottom of Exhibit 2 show that uniformly increasing eligibility to 300 percent of poverty would expand eligibility by an additional 11.7 percent (or 9.1 million children; SE, 0.6). Among children in this group, 72.4 percent had private coverage, and the uninsurance rate was 13.1 percent. An additional 14.6 percent already had public coverage (again reflecting a combination of continuation coverage, medically needy coverage, and errors in our data or the processing of eligibility). The total number of uninsured children in this group was 1.2 million (SE, 0.1; data not shown).
Rolling back eligibility thresholds to 200 percent of the federal poverty level would eliminate eligibility for 3.7 percent of the nation's children (or 2.9 million children; SE, 0.3). The public coverage rate in this rollback group was 23.9 percent, which is lower than the public coverage rate among all SCHIP-eligible children by nearly one-third. Converting this percentage into a population total, the simulated rollback would affect the eligibility of 0.7 million children with public coverage (SE, 0.1; data not shown). However, this estimate includes some nonqualifying immigrant children covered by separate state programs and some children whose families pay premiums for their Medicaid waiver coverage. Focusing solely on federally funded SCHIP, the corresponding estimate is 0.5 million (SE, 0.1), which is consistent with an estimate developed from administrative data of 0.586 million children. 13 n Detailed characteristics. Exhibit 3 presents detailed socioeconomic characteristics for the three policy-relevant groups identified above: eligible but uninsured children; the "expansion" group of uninsured children; and the "rollback" group of publicly insured children. For comparison, we also present results for the overall population of children and for all children enrolled in public coverage. As in Exhibit 2, we combined data from 2004 and 2005 for the first three columns of the exhibit. Because of very small sample sizes, we pooled data from 2002-2005 for the last two columns (reducing comparability across columns but increasing precision).
14 Age, health status, ethnicity, and family structure. Eligible but uninsured children differed from the overall population on several dimensions. They were somewhat older, less likely to be in excellent or very good health, disproportionately Hispanic, and more likely to come from single-parent (or no-parent) families and from families where all parents were unemployed. Compared with children enrolled in public coverage, the eligible but uninsured were somewhat healthier, and they were less likely to be in families below the poverty level or to have parents who were eligible for public coverage.
Uninsured children in the expansion population differed markedly from the eligible but uninsured. They mirrored more closely the overall population with respect to age, health status, race, and family structure. Indeed, these children were more likely than the average U.S. child to have at least one parent working full time.
Publicly insured children in the rollback population were younger and more likely to be Hispanic than the overall population, and they were less likely to be in w 6 2 4 1 6 A u g u s t 2 0 0 7
H e a l t h R e f o r m excellent or very good health. Like uninsured children in the expansion group, they were more likely than children overall to have at least one parent working full time. These children were also much less likely to have a parent who was eligible for public coverage (8.2 percent versus 17.5 percent). Job-based insurance offers. Perhaps the most important determinant of children's private coverage at any income level is whether a parent (or guardian) is offered health insurance through work. The percentage of eligible but uninsured children with parents who were offered employer-sponsored insurance (33.7 percent) was far below the national average (68.4 percent). In contrast, offer rates to parents were much higher both among the expansion uninsured and among children with public coverage in the rollback population. The latter result raises the possibility that private coverage would increase in response to an eligibility rollback. However, the parents of nearly two-fifths of these children do not have offers of insurance from their employers, and in the expansion population, 37 percent of ineligible children without such offers were uninsured (SE, 4.4; data not shown).
Citizenship. With respect to nativity and immigration, only 3.5 percent of children with public coverage were noncitizens-a percentage close to the national average. Only 1.4 percent of publicly insured children were naturalized immigrants. In contrast, first-generation Americans (children born in the United States of immigrant parents) were disproportionately likely to be enrolled in public coverage-and were even more heavily represented among the eligible but uninsured group. Among the eligible but uninsured, only 63.9 percent were second-(or higher-) generation Americans, versus 81.8 percent overall, and 22.8 percent were either noncitizens (7.8 percent) or the native-born children of noncitizens (15.0 percent). We see a similar distribution of nativity and citizenship in the rollback group. In contrast, children in the expansion population essentially mirrored the nativity and citizenship of the overall population.
Although noncitizen children represented 7.8 percent of the eligible but uninsured group, many noncitizen children were uninsured and had low family incomes and yet were ineligible based on their immigration status. Among noncitizen children, 61.5 percent (SE, 2.4) were in families below 200 percent of poverty, but only 36.5 percent (SE, 2.4) were eligible for public coverage (data not shown). In part because of eligibility restrictions, noncitizen children had an uninsurance rate of 44.1 percent in our pooled sample (SE, 2.5; data not shown).
Discussion
Our results document the dramatic increases in children's eligibility since 1996, as well as the progress made in reducing uninsurance among children. In a previ- "Although some states took steps to limit enrollment, on average there have been impressive improvements in take-up."
ous study of the 1996-2002 MEPS data, we wrote, "It may be overly optimistic to anticipate continued improvements in take-up rates beyond the period of our study," citing mounting state fiscal pressures and possible shortfalls in federal matching funds. 15 As of 2005, this prediction has proved to be overly pessimistic. Although some states took steps to limit enrollment, on average there have been impressive improvements in take-up, and the nation's uninsurance rate among children in 2005 stood below that recorded in 1977. 16 Despite this improvement, 11.4 percent of all children (8.9 million) lacked coverage during the first half of 2005, and 5.5 million of these children were eligible for public coverage but were not enrolled. It is against this backdrop that the nation faces an important debate over future steps regarding SCHIP income thresholds, strategies for enrolling eligible children, and the restructuring of public subsidies for private insurance.
n SCHIP income thresholds. Looking first at the debate over SCHIP income thresholds, on the one hand, children who would be affected by either an expansion or a rollback of SCHIP thresholds tend to be, by definition, in families well above the poverty level. It is therefore reasonable to ask parents at these income levels to bear significant responsibility for providing their children with coverage, especially if aided by increased subsidies for private coverage. Indeed, the great majority (72.4 percent) of children in our simulated SCHIP expansion had private coverage-a fact that likely increases the risk of having expanded public eligibility crowd out private insurance. It is also true that 61.8 percent of children in our simulated SCHIP rollback had a parent who was eligible for employment-related coverage, potentially providing these children with a private coverage option should they lose eligibility for public coverage. Although there continues to be debate over the exact magnitude of crowd-out, it is likely that some substitution away from private coverage would occur with further expansion (or toward private coverage with a rollback). 17 On the other hand, our results document that expanded eligibility has reduced uninsurance among children. A large body of literature demonstrates in turn that reducing uninsurance among children increases their access to and use of medical care, reduces preventable hospitalizations, and reduces families' financial burdens from health care. 18 Evidence suggests that expanding eligibility leads not only to increased coverage among the newly eligible, but also to greater take-up among already eligible children. 19 Of particular concern with respect to a rollback of eligibility are children whose parents are not offered employer-sponsored insurance. Purchasing nongroup coverage for children may well involve financial strain for families with incomes of 200-300 percent of poverty. 20 Among expansion children whose parents lack a job-based insurance offer, the uninsurance rate in 2004-05 was 37.0 percent, and it is reasonable to assume that similar uninsurance rates would prevail among children whose parents lack insurance offers in the event of an SCHIP rollback, absent offsetting increases in subsidies for private coverage.
More fundamentally, an unappreciated aspect of crowd-out is that private inw 6 2 6 1 6 A u g u s t 2 0 0 7 surance is itself subsidized through tax exclusions. 21 One must be careful to account for this subsidy, along with savings on uncompensated care and other public programs, when considering the cost of expanding SCHIP. In a previous study, we estimated that the true cost of covering a child in SCHIP is only half the apparent budgetary amount when one accounts for offsetting program savings. 22 Another factor helping reduce costs is that more than 90 percent of all eligible children above 200 percent of poverty face cost sharing in the form of premiums, copayments for services, or both. 23 n Enrolling eligible but uninsured children. Regardless of the outcome of the debate over SCHIP thresholds, we must not lose sight of the enrollment (and retention) shortfalls demonstrated by the number of eligible but uninsured children. We found that as of 2005, 62 percent of all uninsured children (5.5 million) were eligible for free or highly subsidized public coverage. Of these, 36.1 percent were in families with incomes below poverty, and another 41.4 percent were in families with incomes of 100-200 percent of poverty. They are disproportionately minority and more likely than average to live in homes with only a single (or no) parent. Clearly, this group includes some of the most disadvantaged children in the United States.
The remaining eligible but uninsured children would likely be relatively inexpensive to cover. They are in somewhat better health than children already enrolled in public coverage. Indeed, Medicaid allows eligible children to delay enrollment until they are in need of care, so that the public bears much of their cost whether they are enrolled prospectively or not. With respect to crowd-out, we note that the private coverage rate was only 17.2 percent among children eligible for Medicaid.
Making children eligible for free or low-cost public insurance is only one method to reduce uninsurance among children. Careful consideration should also be given to the cost and effectiveness of policies that would improve access to private coverage. Nevertheless, when public coverage is used as a tool to reduce uninsurance among children, one confronts the question of how to help ensure that public programs reach all of the children they were designed to cover. Certainly, remarkable progress has been made. Since 2001, the number of eligible but uninsured children has fallen by 28 percent, from 7.6 million to 5.5 million. Intensive outreach efforts appear to be bearing fruit, and continued research into and experimentation with methods to enroll and retain eligible children may well lead to further gains. 24 Nevertheless, the remaining group of eligible but uninsured children may prove difficult to reach. Eligible seniors are automatically enrolled in both Medicare Part A (free) and Medicare Part B (premium) upon reaching age sixty-five, to maintain high enrollment rates. There is a growing literature sug- "Clearly, the group of eligible uninsured children includes some of the most disadvantaged children in the United States."
gesting that one way to improve take-up among children would be to make more extensive use of schools, school lunch programs, the food stamps program, and other public programs to help identify and, if necessary, automatically enroll children in Medicaid and SCHIP. 25 W h e t h e r t h e u lt i m at e s o lu t i o n is automatic enrollment in public coverage or restructured public incentives to encourage private coverage, our results contribute to this debate by documenting the persistence of uninsurance among the nation's disadvantaged children, despite eligibility for free or highly subsidized public coverage.
